Fully secure hidden vector encryption under standard assumptions
Introduction
Recently, predicate encryption [28] has received considerable attention as a new vision in public key encryption. In a predicate encryption scheme, an encryptor uses a public key PK to generate a ciphertext CT x,M , which is an encryption of an arbitrary access control policy x 2 X as well as a message M, and an authority who has a master secret key generates a secret key sk y for another access control policy y 2 Y. Using sk y , the ciphertext CT x,M is successfully decrypted, i.e., the decryption outputs the right message M if and only if P(x, y) = 1, where P is a predicate function defined as P:X Â Y ? {0, 1}. A primary security property of predicate encryption is that the ciphertext CT x,M leaks no information about either x or M. 1 Nevertheless, the possibility of computing the predicate P(x, y) without revealing x from the ciphertext can provide a good solution for searching encrypted data.
One application of predicate encryption could be an electronic health record system where patients' sensitive data should be securely encrypted. When patients' data needs to be accessed by an outside entity, access should be limited to only the minimum necessary amount of data. In the health record system, each doctor has its own public/private key pair, and encrypts a patient's data M each time the doctor treats a patient. The data M is encrypted along with an access policy xthat could be comprised of a set of attributes like the name of the patient, name of a disease, date of treatment, etc. If an outside entity later requests an access token associated with a particular access policy y, the doctor generates a private key sk y and gives it to the entity as a token. Within the security of predicate encryption, the outside entity is able to access the set of on all ciphertexts fCTx ;M g in a storage server. This is because the decryptor does not know any information on the stored or incoming ciphertexts in advance and each ciphertext could possibly become the one that matches skỹ. The O(') pairing computations will become burdensome for the decryptor if the number ' increases to deal with more expressive access control, and become seriously problematic if a large number of users can have access to the storage system.
The size of skỹ becomes an important factor since each skỹ should be transmitted in a secure channel from the authority to the decryptor. In a storage system with a large number of users, the transmission can be viewed as a reverse situation of broadcast encryption [19] where a central authority broadcasts encrypted messages to many receivers. Shortening the size of broadcast ciphertexts has long been a central issue in designing broadcast encryption schemes [10, 39] . Thus, like in broadcast encryption, it is necessary to shorten the transmission size of skỹ as the number of users increases. Also, this is especially the case when the authority is based on a device with restricted resources like a smart phone. Until now, only a few HVE schemes [40, 29] have achieved both O(1) pairing computations and O(1) size of private keys in a weaker security model (described below).
Security of HVE
It is better for an HVE scheme to be fully (or adaptively) secure. Full security means that an adversary is allowed to make both matching and non-matching private key queries for two target pairs ðx b ; M b Þ for b = 0, 1. In other words, any private key query forỹ is permitted as long as Pðx 0 ;ỹÞ ¼ Pðx 1 ;ỹÞ. In fact, this is the complete security notion of HVE that was suggested in [11] , but no previous HVE (or even IPE) schemes have achieved full security. Most earlier HVE schemes [13, 44, 27, 28, 36, 40, 29, 38] have argued their security in a selective security model (originated from [15] ), albeit permitting the two type of key queries. Recently, several constructions [30, 35, 18] have overcome the barrier of selective security by adapting the technique of dual system encryption [46] , but are unfortunately not yet fully secure since their security models allow an adversary to make only nonmatching private key queries. This incomplete security is described as 'weakly attribute-hiding'.
There is a strict difference between weakly attribute-hiding security and full security. In the former case, the adversary is allowed to make only non-matching queries so that it cannot employ queried keys to decrypt a challenge ciphertext that is an encryption of ðx b ; M b Þ for a randomly chosen b 2 {0, 1}. This ensures that the adversary does not know any information about (the whole of)x b and M b , provided that any matching key is not given. In contrast, full security considers an adversary that is able to ask both matching and non-matching queries. Naturally, full security encompasses weakly attributing security by additionally considering the case where an adversary is able to have matching keys. The additional security guarantees that even if the adversary knows information about the message 3 and (partial)x b that involves the same vector components
. . . ; x b;' Þ (b = 0, 1), the adversary does not gain any information about the pairwise-distinct vector components inx b from the ciphertext. Although we have powerful tools like dual system encryption [46] for achieving adaptive security, the resulting HVE schemes [30, 35, 18] have been limited to weak attribute hiding. A natural direction of research would be to provide an answer to the open problem by presenting an HVE scheme that can be proven to be fully secure. Another challenge is that it is clearly desirable for HVE security to rely on well-known standard assumptions. Of all suggested HVE schemes (which are all pairing-based), only a few constructions [27, 38, 35] have demonstrated security under the Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) and Decision Linear (DLIN) assumptions. These constructions are all based on prime-order groups and can be instantiated using either symmetric or asymmetric bilinear maps.
Our contribution
We present the first HVE scheme that is fully secure under the DBDH and DLIN assumptions, and additionally achieves O(1) pairing computations and O(1)-sized private keys. Table 1 in Section 5 will compare our scheme with previous HVE schemes in terms of efficiency and security. We have developed a new method to realize dual system encryption in prime-order groups. Our method is similar to the original Waters' method [46] in the sense that tag values are critically used to solve a paradox in our dual system technology. Based on the new dual system encryption, we suggest our HVE scheme by introducing two techniques to hide each component ofx from the ciphertext and also to compress tag values that would otherwise be associated with each component. Fortunately, combining these new techniques leads to improvements in efficiency and thus we can avoid the dependance on the dimension ' in terms of both private key size and pairing computations.
When i is a blinding factor that plays a key role in preventing the component x i from being revealed in groups with bilinear maps. In decryption, ciphertext components that need to match skỹ for the vectorỹ ¼ ðy 1 ; . . . ; y ' Þ are multiplied together, resulting in
The important point here is that the tag values {tag i } are compressed into one. Thus, if the secret key skỹ is constructed into the similar compressed form of
for a randomly chosen exponent r, we can make the size of skỹ constant, irrelevant to the number of vector components embedded into skỹ. Moreover since skỹ consists of a constant number of group elements, the number of pairing computations necessary for decryption also becomes constant. To achieve full security, our proof is divided into two cases: (1) all private key queries are non-matching and (2) at least one private key query is matching. In the first case, we can apply the hybrid argument of dual system encryption [46] to prove the confidentiality of M b , and on top of that we need to consider an additional hybrid argument to prove the confidentiality ofx b . In the second case, at least one queried key can be used for successful decryption so that the message-hiding property is no longer necessary. At first glance, the adversary in the second case can ask all private key queries that are matching ones, which might make the second case proof seem challenging. However, for an index i 2 {1, . . . , '} such that x 0,i -x 1,i in both challenge vectors x b ¼ ðx b;0 ; . . . ; x b;' Þðb ¼ 0; 1Þ, any key query forỹ that includes an ith component can not be matching, i.e., should be non-matching as in the first case. Using this fact, we can create a variant of the hybrid argument applied in the first case proof.
Since any HVE implies an anonymous IBE, our HVE construction can yield a new anonymous IBE scheme that is fully secure under the standard assumptions. Full security is straightforwardly achieved by using the same strategy as in the first case above, since all private key queries for identities should all be non-matching. Prior to our new result, several schemes [20, 30, 35] have been presented to offer full security without random oracles, and only [35] is fully secure under the DLIN assumption. Compared to [35] , our anonymous IBE scheme is more efficient in all respects.
Preliminaries

Hidden vector encryption
Let R be an arbitrary set of attributes, and let ⁄ be a wildcard character which is not involved with any attribute. We let In the above definition, the message M is a real message that the encryptor wishes to send to recipients. In practice, M can also be used as a symmetric key with which authenticated encryption works to check the validity of the ciphertext.
Security for hidden vector encryption
Following [13, 28, 11, 35] , we describe the security for HVE that captures the intuition that the ciphertext CT reveals no information about ðx; MÞ. The security is defined in the following interaction between an adversary A and a challenger C, where ' is given to A.
Setup: C runs the setup algorithm to obtain the public key PK and the secret key SK. It gives PK to A. Query Phase 1: A adaptively issues a polynomial number of token queries for vectors,r i . C responds with the corresponding tokens TKr i GenTokenðSK;r i Þ. Challenge: A outputsx Definition 1. We say that a Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) scheme is (attribute-hiding) secure if for any polynomial time adversaries A attacking the HVE scheme, the advantage Adv HVE A is negligible.
Bilinear maps and complexity assumptions
Bilinear Maps: We adopt the notation in [9, 6] . Let G and G T be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p. We assume that g is a generator of G. Let e : G Â G ! G T be a function that has the following properties:
there is an efficient algorithm to compute the map e.
Then, we say that the map e is a bilinear map in G. Note that e(,) is symmetric since e(g a , g
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Problem: The DBDH problem [9] is defined as follows: given
The Decision Linear (DLIN) Problem: The DLIN problem [8] was originally stated as follows: given g; g
We consider an equivalently modified version such as: given g; g
This was already used in [12] . Definition 2. We say that the {DBDH, DLIN} assumption holds in G if the advantage of any polynomial time algorithm in solving the {DBDH, DLIN} problem is negligible. Remark 1. In the groups equipped with symmetric bilinear maps e : G Â G ! G T , we can see that the DBDH assumption is weaker than the DLIN assumption. To show this, let us assume that there is an adversary to solve DBDH problem. , and otherwise, Z is random. It seems that the opposite direction does not hold, and also the relation between the n-DLIN assumption (n > 2) (which is also weaker than the DLIN assumption) and the DBDH is not clear.
Fully secure HVE scheme
Construction
Let G and G T be groups of prime order p, and let e : G Â G ! G T be the bilinear map. We assume that each attribute x i belongs to R ¼ Z p and our scheme deals with '-dimensional vectorx ¼ ðx 1 ; . . . ; x ' Þ 2 R ' . If necessary, we can extend our construction to handle arbitrary attributes in {0, 1}
⁄ by first hashing each x i using a collision-resistant hash function
Setup (k): Given a security parameter k 2 Z þ , the setup algorithm runs GðkÞ to obtain a tuple ðp; G; G T ; eÞ. The algorithm picks a random generator g 2 G, random elements
If a = 0, the algorithm tries again with new random exponents. It sets
The public key PK (along with the description of ðp; G; G T ; eÞÞ and the secret key msk are set to be
Encrypt ðPK; ðx; MÞÞ:
To encrypt a message M 2 M # G T and the vectorx under the public key PK, the encryption algorithm picks random exponents s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; ftag c;i g ' i¼1 in Z p and computes the ciphertext
p as follows:
GenToken ðSK;rÞ: Letr ¼ ðr 1 ; . . . ; r ' Þ 2 I
' . Let SðrÞ be the set of all indexes i such that r i -⁄. To generate a token TKr for the vectorr, the token generation algorithm picks random exponents r 1 ; r 2 ; r 3 ; r 4 ; tag k 2 Z p and obtains r 5 2 Z p such that ðR i2SðrÞ y i Þr 3 ¼ cr 5 . The algorithm computes the token TKr ¼ ðK 1 ; . . . ; K 9 ; tag k Þ 2 G 9 Â Z p as follows:
Decrypt ðCT; TKrÞ: To decrypt a ciphertext CT ¼ C 1 ; . . . ; fC 6;i ; C 7;i g ' i¼1 ; C 8 ; C 9 ; ftag c;i g ' i¼1 using a private key TKr ¼ ðK 1 ; . . . ; K 9 ; tag k Þ, the decryption algorithm sets
If tag c -tag k , the decryption algorithm proceeds as follows:
Performance: Note that a token consists of 9 group elements in G plus 1 group element in Z p , and the decryption algorithm requires 9 pairing operations. These two efficiency factors are independent of the dimension ' of the attribute vectors.
Correctness
We first check that A 1 ¼ K 
Next, notice that
Then, if P ' ðr;xÞ ¼ 1, (i.e., r i = x i for all i 2 SðrÞ), we can see that A 2 ¼ eðg; vÞ s 2 r 3 Á eðg; uÞ s 2 r 4 by the following computation: Finally, the message M is correctly recovered as 
Otherwise, if P ' ðr;xÞ ¼ 0, this means that there is at least one component r i -x i for some i 2 SðrÞ. Let D be the set of indexes i 2 SðrÞ such that r i -x i . In this case, the computation above becomes Thus, the final output becomes M if R i2D (log g h i )(x i À r i ) = 0 in Z p . However, it is computationally hard to find pairs (x i , r i ) for i 2 D for which such an equality holds. In fact, the probability of a false positive is at most 1/p in each decryption.
Fully secure anonymous IBE scheme
Any HVE scheme implies an anonymous IBE scheme if the vectorsx andr are limited to one dimension. Thus, our HVE scheme provides a new anonymous IBE scheme that is fully secure under standard assumptions such as the DLIN and DBDH assumptions. Prior to our result, several works [9, 20, 12, 42, 16, 2, 17] (including all previous HVE and IPE schemes) have been proposed, but until now there were few anonymous IBE schemes [20, 30, 35 ] that achieve full security without using random oracles. Our new scheme is another example, but is fully secure under the standard assumptions. Compared to [35] , which has comparable security, our construction is more efficient in all efficiency respects. Table 2 in Section 5 presents the result by simply assigning the dimension to 1. To demonstrate security of any anonymous IBE scheme, testing for weak attribute hiding is sufficient since two target pairs (ID b , M b ) for b = 0,1 should be equal as long as at least one matching query is asked. Thus, security of our new anonymous IBE scheme is straightforwardly obtained from the proof of Case 1 (defined in the next section) where only non-matching token queries are permitted. 4 The hierarchical extension of our anonymous IBE scheme can not be realized due to the relation ðR i2SðrÞ y i Þr 3 ¼ cr 5 
Security proof
Semi-functional algorithms
We now describe the semi-functional ciphertexts and tokens. Their main purpose is to define the structures that will be used in our proof.
Semi-functional ciphertexts
The algorithm first runs the encryption algorithm to generate a normal ciphertext
for a vectorx and a message M. The algorithm selects a random exponent x 2 Z p and sets
The semi-functional ciphertext is CT sf ¼ C 1 ; . . . ; fC 6;i ;
If one tries to decrypt the semi-functional ciphertext with a normal token TKr forr, then the decryption would be correctly performed. This stems from the fact that
where K 1 , K 2 , and K 4 are components of the normal token.
Semi-functional tokens
The algorithm first runs the token generation algorithm to generate a normal token TKr ¼ K 0 1 ; . . . ; K 0 9 ; tag k À Á for a vectorr. Next the algorithm picks a random exponent k 2 Z p and sets
Then, the semi-functional token is TK sf r ¼ ðK 1 ; . . . ; K 9 ; tag k Þ. Note that the element K 5 becomes
If one tries to decrypt a normal ciphertext encrypted underx with the semi-functional token TK sf r , the decryption would be also correctly performed. This can be checked from the fact that
where C 1 , C 2 , and C 5 are components of the normal ciphertext.
We note that when a semi-functional token is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the semi-functional components in two parts will be computed as follows:
which is not equal to 1 in G T . 4 The condition should be different when considering security of anonymous Hierarchical IBE, where both matching and non-matching token queries are justified for two identity vectors upon which an adversary wants to challenge.
Proof of security
In the security game defined in Section 2, the adversary A outputs two vectorsx
and two messages M 0 ; M 1 2 M as its challenge. The goal of A is to decide which one of the two pairsx
Á is associated with the challenge ciphertext. All tokens will be normal and the challenge ciphertext will also be normal. This is the real security game Game Real . Under the rules of the security game, A that makes at most q token queries will behave in one of two different ways:
Case 1 A will make token queries for vectorsr i such that P ' ðr i ;x
In this case, it should be the case that M 0 = M 1 .
In our security proof, the simulator needs to guess which case it will be in by flipping a coin. If the guess is wrong, the simulator aborts the simulation and outputs a random bit as its answer. Since the simulator's guess will be independent of which case A behaves in, the simulation is able to proceed with probability 1/2. Depending on the case by guess, the simulator prepares its simulation differently. We describe the simulator's strategy in two cases.
Case 1: (Proof idea) We first give an idea behind the security proof in Case 1. Since A cannot make any matching token query, we can adapt a similar proof strategy to one in the Waters' original dual system encryption [46] . That is, we create a sequence of hybrid games, where the challenge ciphertext and all tokens are changed into semi-functional ones, and we can then change the message M b for a random bit b 2 {0, 1} into a random message. This is the same as in [46] , but the difference is that we create an additional sequence of hybrid games, based on the result of randomizing M b , in order to change each component of the vectorx Ã b into a random one. During these two sequences of hybrid games, tag values are crucially used to solve the paradox that happens inevitably when proving full security.
The simulator considers a sequence of hybrid games as follows:
Real : This is the actual HVE security game in Case 1. All tokens will be normal and the challenge ciphertext will be a normal challenge ciphertext on a pairx : All tokens will be semi-functional, and the challenge ciphertext will be a semi-functional ciphertext on a pair ((r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r ' ), R), where all r i for i = 1, . . . , ' are random elements from R.
In Game x;' , the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary is a semi-functional ciphertext corresponding to ((r 1 , . . . , r ' ), R) that leaks no information aboutx
We will show that no polynomial time adversary is able to distinguish between Game 
B (implicitly) sets
Notice that each public key element is independently and uniformly distributed as in the actual construction. Also, we can see that
Key Generation Phases 1 and 2 A issues token queries for vectors fr i g. For any queried vectorr i , it is easy for B to generate a normal token TKr i , since it knows exponents X; c; fy i g ; B implicitly sets s 1 = z 3 and s 2 = z 4 . B computes C 3 ; C 5 ; fC 6;i ; C 7;i g ' i¼1 ; C 8 , and C 9 elements as
Next, B computes C 1 , C 2 , and C 4 elements as follows:
If Z ¼ g z 2 ðz 3 þz 4 Þ , then we have that
In this case, the ciphertext will have the same distribution as a normal ciphertext. Thus, B is playing Game Real with A. On the other hand, if Z ¼ g z 2 ðz 3 þz 4 Þ g p for some (non-zero) random p 2 Z p , then 
(Here, we can exclude the unlikely event that c = 0 and f 3 = 0 in Z p .) B sets w 1 / 1 + w 2 / 2 = b and
Key Generation Phases A issues token queries for vectors fr i g. B breaks the token generation phases into three cases. Consider ith query issued by A. Since B knows exponents w 1 , w 2 , f 1 , and f 2 , it is easy to compute a semi-functional token. Case III: i = k.
For the requested vectorr i ; B picks random exponents r 3 ; r 4 2 Z p and sets
where r i,j is a non-wildcard component inr i . It (implicitly) setsr 1 
Note that the equation ðR j2Sðr i Þ y j Þr 3 ¼ cr 5 is satisfied. B generates K 3 , K 4 , K 6 , K 7 , K 8 , and K 9 elements as follows:
Next, B generates K 1 , K 2 , and K 5 elements as
In this case, B generates the ith token as a normal token, so B plays Game kÀ1 with A. On the other hand, if
where p plays a random exponent k in Z p . In this case, B generates the ith token as a semi-functional token, so B plays Game k with A. Challenge Ciphertext A outputs two vectorsx 
. B computes a semi-functional ciphertext forx
;
In computing C 4 , we have that
where a = w 1 d 1 + w 2 d 2 . Then, the unknown term ðg z 1 z 2 Þ Àax is canceled out by the opposite term ðg z 1 z 2 Þ ax that comes from the calculation of Fs
axz 2 þs 2 . Also, in computing C 6,i , the term g z 1 inserted into u i , h i , and v i is also canceled out by setting
are information-theoretically hidden to the adversary, and because of the restriction P 'ri ;x Proof. Suppose that there exists an adversary A which can attack our HVE scheme with non-negligible advantage . We describe an algorithm B which uses A to solve the DBDH problem with advantage . On input ðg; g a ; g b ; g c ; ZÞ 2 G 4 Â G T ; B's goal is to output 1 if Z = e(g, g) abc and 0 otherwise. B interacts with A as follows:
Setup B selects random exponents a; X; c;
Observe that the unknown term g ab is canceled out in K 1 , K 2 , and K 3 elements, respectively. ; M b Þ as follows:
In this case, B generates the semi-functional ciphertext for the vector ðr 1 ; . . . ; r kÀ1 ; x Theorem 1 (Case 1). Assume the DLIN and DBDH assumptions hold in G. Then, our HVE scheme is (attribute-hiding) secure in Case 1. Case 2: (Proof idea) We give a key idea behind the security proof in Case 2. When given the challenge ciphertext, the adversary aims to decide which one of the two pairsx
is associated with the challenge ciphertext. As in Case 1, the basic step is to change the challenge ciphertexts into semi-functional one, but the difference is that tokens are changed from normal to semi-functional ones or vice versa during the security game. The main obstacle comes from the fact that the adversary can query matching tokens for both the challenge vectorsx 1;k , we will perform the same process in generating tokens until the challenge phase. However, when the adversary outputsx
;k , then we cannot construct the semi-functional challenge ciphertext since the adversary can be already given semi-functional tokens associated with the k-th component
Fortunately, in that case, we can move onto the next position k + 1 without generating the challenge ciphertext at position k, which is because the challenge ciphertext at position k has exactly the same distribution as that in the previous position k À 1 (or further previous position). Before moving onto the next position k + 1, we return all semi-functional tokens into normal ones to prepare for generating tokens in the next position. In this way, we can proceed to the last vector component.
Real : This is the actual HVE security game in Case 2. All tokens will be normal and the challenge ciphertext will be a normal challenge ciphertext on a pairx , the challenge ciphertext given to the adversary is a semi-functional ciphertext corresponding to ((r 1 , . . . , r ' ), M) that leaks no information aboutx text correctly. The impossibility of decryption allows the simulator to change the tokens from normal to semi-functional even if the challenge ciphertext will also be semi-functional. However, other tokens remain normal so that A is able to use the other normal tokens to decrypt the challenge ciphertext successfully. Once the tokens including the k-th component r i,k and the challenge ciphertext will be semi-functional, the k-th component x Ã b;k for a random bit b 2 {0,1} is replaced with a random element. This is performed in a game defined (below) as Game will be semi-functional and the other tokens will be normal, and the challenge ciphertext will be a semi-functional ciphertext on a pair r 1 ; . . . ; r kÀ1 ; x will be semi-functional and the other tokens will be normal, and the challenge ciphertext will be a semi-functional ciphertext on a pair r 1 ; . . . ; r kÀ1 ; x ; M , where r k is random.
: The first q k À 1 tokens in fr i g q k i¼1 will be semi-functional and the other tokens will be normal, and the challenge ciphertext will be a semi-functional ciphertext on a pair r 1 ; . . . ; r k ; x Proof. The proof of Claim 1 is almost identical to that of Lemma 2. The difference is that the first j À 1 tokens in fr i g q k i¼1 are generated as semi-functional ones, and the j-th token is generated using the target element Z of a DLIN problem, and the other tokens are generated as normal ones. h Claim 2. Suppose that the DLIN assumption holds. Then no polynomial time adversary A can distinguish between Game 2 kÀ1;q k and Game kÀ1,F with non-negligible advantage.
Proof. The proof of Claim 2 is almost identical to that of Lemma 4. The difference is that all tokens in fr i g q k i¼1 are generated as semi-functional ones and the other tokens are generated as normal ones. In constructing the challenge ciphertext, the elements fC 6;i g Table 1 gives a comparison of the different features in previous HVE schemes and ours when encrypting '-dimensional vectors. Any IPE scheme can be straightforwardly transformed into an HVE scheme by expanding the dimension of vectors from ' to 2' [28] , so we consider the previous IPE schemes [28, 36, 30, 38, 35, 34] handling 2'-dimensional vectors as HVE schemes handling '-dimensional vectors. We point out that [34] is an independent work that has recently suggested a fully secure IPE scheme. In terms of achieving full security, [30, 18, 35] are weakly attribute-hiding in the sense that an adversary can make token queries such that P 'x In any case, our HVE scheme (as well as the independent work [34] ) is the first one that is fully secure in the security model where both matching and non-matching token queries are validly considered in a single security game.
Comparison to other HVE schemes
Regarding efficiency, the schemes in [40, 29, 34] and ours have the property that both token size and the number of pairing computations (necessary for decryption) do not depend on the dimension ' of attribute vectors. As mentioned before, these schemes are desirable in applications where ' increases to deal with more expressive access control. Table 1 simply shows the comparison of ' conjunctive equality predicates, but when we consider access control along with conjunctive combination of comparison and subset predicates, the efficiency impact is stronger. For instance, if a subset predicate is defined over a set of n elements, one subset predicate leads to a token of size O(n) and pairing computations of size O(n). Thus, if an access control is a conjunctive combination that consists of ' 1 equality, ' 2 comparison, and ' 3 subset predicates, the token size and pairing computations for such an access control increase with O(' 1 + ' 2 + n' 3 ) in other HVE schemes. However, in [40, 29, 34] and ours, these two factors remain O(1) regardless of the numbers of conjunctions.
Conclusion
We presented the first HVE scheme that is fully secure under the DBDH and DLIN assumptions. Our HVE scheme required O(1)-sized private keys and O(1) paring computations for decryption, regardless of the dimension of vectors. These advantages are attractive to the query server as the dimension increases to support more expressed access control. This was achieved by first constructing a novel type of (tag-based) dual system encryption. New techniques were then applied to both conceal vector components from ciphertexts and compress tag values into one. Our HVE scheme also yielded an anonymous IBE scheme that is fully secure under the standard assumptions.
It was difficult to extend our HVE (and anonymous IBE) scheme to support a hierarchical delegation mechanism. Thus, it is still an open problem to construct an HVE scheme supporting delegation, while preserving full security under standard assumptions. Another interesting open problem is to create an IPE scheme that is fully secure under standard assumptions in a way that both matching and non-matching key queries are allowed. It would also be interesting to show how to reduce the number of pairing computations to O(1) in an IPE scheme, which has seemed difficult to achieve.
